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This paper, which gives me the ability to say something further about the 
issues involved in my book Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and 
the  Problem of Suffering (WID),1 was made possible by a  session on 
the book at the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, 
centred on papers by John martin Fischer and David mcNaughton, and 
by a workshop on the book which was held at the university of Innsbruck 
(organized by Georg Gasser, under the aegis of a Templeton grant on 
analytic theology) and which included papers by Christian Feldbacher, 
Georg Gasser, Adam Green, and lukas Kraus. I am grateful to all of these 
philosophers for their gracious and generous comments on my book, 
and for their carefully reasoned, thoughtful engagement with some of 
the book’s central ideas. I am glad of this opportunity to respond to their 
stimulating comments on my work, which help me to clarify some things 
that matter to the book’s project.
In one short paper, it is not remotely possible to do justice to all 
the interesting issues in their comments. With regret, therefore, I have 
concentrated my comment on only a very few of the issues they raise, 
generally those that let me clarify or defend further something that 
strikes me as particularly important to the project as I  had originally 
conceived it.
1 eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering 
(oxford: oxford university Press, 2010).
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I. THe CombINATIoN oF meTHoDoloGIeS
Christian Feldbacher worries that my attempt to combine the 
Franciscan mode and the Dominican mode leads not to a marriage of 
the two methodologies, but to something like an unequal partnership, 
with the Franciscan mode definitely on the underprivileged side. 
I appreciate this worry, because since I am myself an analytic philosopher, 
it is reasonable to expect that I might have leaned to the Dominican mode, 
instead of melding the two methodologies, as I had claimed I would do.
Feldbacher formulates the worry this way. He argues that the stories, 
and whatever Franciscan knowledge the stories provide, do not provide 
premises or support for premises in the central argument that constitutes 
the Thomistic theodicy at the heart of the book.2 As Feldbacher sees it, 
the premises of that theodicy are just what they would have been if I had 
not brought stories into the discussion.
on this score, Feldbacher is right. but, in my view, his being right 
with regard to this claim is not sufficient to validate his complaint about 
the book’s methodology.
In discussing that methodology, I argued that only certain ways of 
bringing narratives into philosophy in general, and into theodicy in 
particular, respect the role of narratives in philosophy. on my view, 
to bring narratives into philosophical argument either as premises 
or as support for premises is to wreck the value of the narratives as 
sources of Franciscan knowledge. Instead, I  argued, narratives should 
be understood as contributing to Dominican argumentation roughly in 
the way life experience contributes to any philosophical understanding 
and argumentation. That experience serves as a  store of insight and 
intuition against the background of which we understand and evaluate, 
consciously or subconsciously, the merits of the premises of the 
philosophical argument.
by way of a concrete example, I said that the narratives examined in 
my book should function in a way analogous to the way in which travel 
to a foreign country shapes one’s understanding of that country. The as-
it-were experience provided by a narrative will deepen one’s perceptions 
and judgments of things, altering them in subtle and not-so-subtle ways, 
just as travel to a foreign country will enrich in countless inexpressible 
2 This theodicy is not identical to the defence the book argues for but is central to it, 
as I explain in the book’s first chapter.
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ways one’s insights into that country. Travel to China, for example, will 
change a person’s understandings of that country and its people in ways 
that he could not represent entirely or at all in propositional form. If 
he could represent his experience propositionally, then he could teach 
others by means of propositions everything he himself learned in his 
travel to China – and that conclusion is of course false.
So what I  claimed is that, although the premises of a  theodicy or 
defence stay the same, even after the examination of the narratives at 
issue, one’s understanding of those premises and one’s ability to evaluate 
them will change very substantially in consequence of the as-it-were 
experience provided by the stories.
I need to add, however, that this way of thinking about the Franciscan 
approach might have been obscured for Feldbacher because he is not 
entirely right about what I  was trying to characterize with the label 
‘Franciscan’. In particular, the distinction of most importance in the 
book is not the distinction between knowledge that and knowledge 
how. Knowledge how does not in fact play a  role in my methodology. 
The relevant distinction is between knowledge that and the knowledge 
of persons, which is direct, intuitive, non-propositional, and subserved 
by distinct brain systems designed precisely for mind-reading between 
conspecifics. As I was at pains to explain in the methodological section 
of the book, this brain system gives us a distinct kind of knowledge of 
persons, and I have argued that this special kind of knowledge can also 
be transmitted to a greater or lesser extent by stories.
II. THe DeSIreS oF THe HeArT
In WID, I also called attention to what is in my view a neglected part of 
the problem of evil, namely, the fact that, even when he is flourishing, 
a person can suffer because he has been denied the desires of his heart. 
In my view, this kind of suffering is redeemed when somehow, through 
suffering, a person receives his heart’s desire but in the reshaped form 
which that desire has when and only when it is interwoven with a much 
deeper desire for union with God.
Adam Green focuses on my claim that neither heart’s desires nor 
their loss or satisfaction is transparent. As he sees it, this claim of mine 
allies my position in some ways with sceptical theism. And he argues 
that the claim is too strong because, with regard to the desires of the 
heart, transparency and opacity come in degrees. He goes on to explore 
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in sensitive and stimulating detail the disparate degrees of opacity for 
heart’s desires and the alteration in that opacity produced by suffering.
In this connection, it is important to clarify that my claim about 
transparency does not entail that a person never knows what the desires 
of her heart are, or whether they have been either satisfied or lost. The 
claim entails only that a person’s views regarding his own heart’s desires 
and their loss or satisfaction are not infallible.3 In this regard, heart’s 
desires are more like health than they are like pain. The state of a person’s 
bodily health is not a  matter that is invariably or infallibly known by 
introspection. on the other hand, as I explained in WID, ‘[i]t is no part 
of Aquinas’s theodicy that suffering and its justifying benefits are opaque 
in every case or will always be opaque’4; and the same point applies 
as regards the desires of the heart. my position requires maintaining 
only that heart’s desires, and their loss or satisfaction, are not always 
completely transparent; it does not require maintaining that they are 
always completely opaque.
In addition, it is important to clarify that, on Aquinas’s theodicy, 
sceptical theism is false: human beings are in a  position to know the 
morally sufficient reasons that justify God in allowing suffering. 
The  epistemic problem for human beings, on Aquinas’s theodicy, is 
not  the inscrutability of God’s mind (or of general modal claims or 
anything else along the same lines). The problem is the inscrutability of 
a human heart and the complexity of a human life, which the omniscient 
mind of God can comprehend, but which is frequently unknown to us. 
The result is that, for Aquinas, although we can know what sceptical 
theism claims  we cannot know, namely, God’s general reasons for 
allowing suffering, we cannot know why God allowed the particular 
suffering he did for any particular sufferer at any particular time. The 
lack of knowledge premised by the defence I  constructed is therefore 
very different from the lack of knowledge postulated by sceptical theism.
With these things clarified, I  want to say only that I  welcome 
Green’s probing investigation of an issue I  left untouched, namely, the 
degrees of transparency a  heart’s desires can have, and the reasons 
for that divergence of degree. Although I  think that there is probably 
more confused complexity to these degrees of transparency than his 
account allows for, the case he mounts for supposing that suffering 
3 WID, pp. 12-13.
4 WID, p. 409.
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adds considerably to the transparency of a person’s desires seems to me 
insightful and helpful. Additional work along the same lines strikes me as 
certain to be significant for development of the Thomistic defense, and 
I hope that he will pursue the issue.
lukas Kraus also raises some important questions regarding my 
treatment of the desires of the heart. Kraus objects that, on the defence 
argued for in the book, the heart’s desires of a suffering person are in fact 
just given up, and not fulfilled.
Kraus holds this view at least in part because he believes that desires 
are individuated by their objects. Now it is certainly true that some 
mental states or powers are individuated by their objects. Vision, for 
example, can be distinguished from hearing by its objects. but the same 
thing is not true of desires, in my view. In particular, heart’s desires are 
not individuated by their objects.
To see the reasons for this claim, consider a story where heart’s desires 
play a central role.
In The Gifts of the Magi, the American author o. Henry tells a story 
about a  wife, who had beautiful hair, and her husband, who had an 
heirloom pocket watch. The wife had her heart set on a pair of combs for 
her hair, and the husband had his heart set on a silver chain for his watch. 
but the two of them were very poor, and the things they wanted were very 
expensive. So they could not buy either the combs or the chain, and they 
did without these highly coveted things. At Christmas, however, in spite 
of their great poverty, each one of them received from the other the very 
marvellous, expensive, and highly desired thing. The wife received those 
combs from her husband, and the husband received the silver chain from 
his wife. And here is how the two of them found the money to buy these 
presents for each other. The husband sold his watch to pay for the hair 
combs, and the wife cut and sold her hair to pay for the silver watch chain.
o. Henry tells this story to show that the husband and the wife each 
got his or her heart’s desire, but in a much more powerful way than either 
of them could have dreamt of. He finishes the story this way:
The magi ... invented the art of giving Christmas presents. being wise, 
their gifts were no doubt wise ones ... And here I have lamely related to 
you the uneventful chronicle of two foolish children in a flat who most 
unwisely sacrificed for each other the greatest treasures of their house. 
but ... let it be said that of all who give gifts these two were the wisest.5
5 o. Henry, 41 Stories (New York: New American library. Signet Classic, 1984), p. 70.
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o. Henry takes this view of the matter because what the wife received 
was not only the hair combs she had so desired. rather, she received 
the combs as a gift of the great, self-sacrificial love of her husband. And, 
mutatis mutandis, the same thing can be said about the husband. He 
received the silver chain he had so wanted, but he received it as a gift of 
the self-sacrificial love of his wife.
Now hair combs as an object of desire is very different from hair 
combs as the expression of a  great love. obviously, one can have 
hair  combs which are not an expression of love. If the wife had won 
a sum in a lottery and bought herself the hair combs with her winnings, 
she would have had the hair combs, but she would not have gotten them 
as the expression of the great love of her husband. It is worth noticing 
too that, at the outset of the story, when the wife wanted the hair combs, 
all she had in her mind to desire was the combs themselves. As her great 
surprise at her Christmas present makes clear, it never entered her mind 
to desire the combs as a gift of great love on her husband’s part. (And, 
mutatis mutandis, similar things can be said about the husband and the 
silver watch chain.)
If we had to individuate desires on the basis of their objects, as Kraus 
supposes, then, with regard to the o. Henry story, we would have to say 
that at Christmas the wife did not have the desire of her heart fulfilled, 
and neither did the husband. rather, each of them failed to get his heart’s 
desire. They may have received something else good, but they did not 
receive what had been their original heart’s desires.
To me a conclusion of this sort seems highly counter-intuitive. on the 
contrary, the whole point of the o. Henry story is that a person can get 
her heart’s desire in a way that is much deeper and better than she could 
ever have imagined.
So I do not think that individuating heart’s desires by their objects 
is a good way to individuate them. In my view, this story prompts us 
to see that the form of any particular desire can be reshaped by the 
deeper desires of which it is an expression without losing its character 
as the desire it was. A desire can refold and still be the same desire, if the 
deeper desire continues to inform it.
Consider in this connection the example I  used in WID involving 
Viktor Klemperer. When Klemperer wanted to write a book on French 
literature, no doubt, that desire was informed by deeper desires of his. 
These deeper desires might be describable in more abstract terms than 
the description of his desire to write a book on French literature, as Kraus 
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supposes. but there will be a limit on the abstraction and generality. So, for 
example, Klemperer’s deeper desire might have been for the fruition of his 
skills and talents – but it would still have been a fruition having to do with 
writing a book. It would not have been for the fruition of his skills and 
talents by means of success in hand-to-hand armed combat, for example.
In my view, because of this relation between the deeper and the 
more superficial heart’s desire, the more superficial desire can be altered 
significantly without its having been given up. And that is why it is right 
to hold that Klemperer did get his heart’s desire when he wrote his diaries, 
even if the diaries were not his scholarly study of French literature.
but suppose that I were wrong on this score and Kraus were right. 
What would follow?
The notion of a  heart’s desire, as I  introduced it, is the notion of 
a  desire at the centre of the web of desire, giving energy to the other 
desires in the web. but, I  argued, for any particular person, there will 
also be a connected hierarchy of such desires, with some much deeper 
than others. So the heart’s desire D1 of a  person Jerome is a  desire 
for something Jerome really wants; but a  deeper heart’s desire D2 is 
a desire that gives the energy to the more superficial desire D1. Without 
desire D2, Jerome would not in fact have desire D1.
Now if Kraus were right, then it could be the case that Jerome never 
got what would satisfy D1, but did get what would satisfy D2 instead. 
Klemperer’s diaries might have fulfilled some deep desire of his, but they 
did not fulfil the heart’s desire he had when he wanted to write a book on 
French literature.
on this way of thinking about heart’s desires, my case would then 
have to be restated this way. Jerome’s suffering because of the loss of his 
heart’s desire D1 would be redeemed by his getting the satisfaction of 
his heart’s desire D2. And since the satisfaction of D2 is what Jerome 
really wanted in wanting D1, his suffering over the loss of D1 is defeated. 
Although, intuitively, I want to resist this restatement, nothing about this 
restatement will alter the major conclusions of the defence.
Finally, what Kraus sees as two strategies on my part for dealing 
with suffering stemming from the desires of the heart is really only 
one: suffering stemming from the loss of heart’s desires is redeemed 
by the satisfaction of heart’s desires only when those desires have been 
reconfigured into an expression of the deepest heart’s desire, which is for 
God. Kraus thinks that this claim makes my position collapse into the 
stern-minded view. but, on the stern-minded view, a person should be 
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content with getting only God as the satisfaction of his heart’s desires. 
my position, however, is better represented by the ending of the book 
of Job, in which Job gets intimacy with God and camels (among other 
things that were his heart’s desires).
III. THe NATure oF A DeFeNCe
In this short paper, I cannot address all the stimulating and thoughtful 
remarks in the papers by John martin Fischer, Georg Gasser, and David 
mcNaughton; but they share a concern about the philosophical nature 
of a  defence and the criteria for a  successful defence, and I  will focus 
my response to their papers largely on that issue. Gasser himself tries 
to answer some of the questions about the nature of a  defence with 
the helpful notion of a worldview, taken in a technical sense. This is an 
insightful approach, in my view, and worth reflecting on further. but here 
I will confine myself just to some more general reflections on the nature 
of a defence and on the use of a defence to deal with the problem of evil.
I want to begin by highlighting what the goal of a defence is. There are 
plenty of arguments purporting to show the existence of God; but in the 
history of philosophy there have generally been just two kinds of argument 
purporting to show the non-existence of God. The most powerful of these 
is the argument from evil.6 So the argument from evil is constructed as an 
attack on theism, and a defence is a response to that attack.
It is crucial to keep this point firmly in mind because it affects greatly 
what we ought to expect in a defence against the argument from evil. 
The point of a defence against an attack is warding off the attack. It is 
true that, insofar as the attack of the argument from evil is warded off 
by a defence, theism is strengthened, because one of the best arguments 
against theism is undermined. but a defence against an attack on theism 
is still not by itself an argument for theism. The job of a defence is to turn 
back an attack. It is not the job of a defence to provide an argument for 
the existence of God, or for the truth of any of the major theistic claims 
about God.
Just in case this point would benefit from belabouring, consider an 
analogous case from biology. In 1911, Peyton rous argued for this thesis:
6 The other kind of argument attempts to show some incoherence in the standard 
divine attributes, such as that sometimes alleged to exist between omnipotence and 
perfect goodness, between omnipotence and divine free will, or between omniscience 
and immutability.
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(The rous thesis): chicken sarcoma r is caused by a virus.
This thesis was rejected with derision by most of those working in the 
field at that time. They rebutted the rous thesis with one or another 
sophisticated version of this argument:
(Attack on the rous thesis):
(1) Chicken sarcoma r runs in families.
(2) No sarcoma that runs in families is caused by a virus.
(3) Therefore, chicken sarcoma r is not caused by a virus.
on the view of the attackers, that argument was sufficient to show that 
the rous thesis was false.
Now, to defend his thesis against this attack, rous did not have to 
mount yet another argument to show that chicken sarcoma r is caused 
by a virus. He did not have to rerun his original experiments or dream 
up new experiments to try to show his thesis true in yet another way. 
All rous had to do to ward off the attack was to undermine one or more 
of the premises in the attackers’ argument or to impugn the argument’s 
validity. In fact, rous argued that premiss (2) is false; that is, he denied the 
claim that no sarcoma that runs in families is caused by a virus. To defend 
his thesis against this attack, it was sufficient to show that premiss false.
but notice that there is a difference between warding off the attack and 
supporting the original thesis. rous might well have been successful in 
warding off the attack by showing the falsity of premiss (2) of the attack 
without its being the case that chicken sarcoma r is caused by a virus. 
A successful defence against the attack on the rous thesis is not the same 
as an argument for the rous thesis. As it happens, rous’s defence against 
the attack was successful; the claim that no sarcoma that runs in families 
is caused by a virus is not true. but the success of rous’s defence does 
not prove that chicken sarcoma r is caused by a virus. And it does not 
prove anything about the nature of the rous sarcoma virus or its mode of 
operation either. All that rous’s defence does is show that this particular 
attack will not work to rule out the rous thesis.
There may have been people for whom this approach on rous’s part 
to defending his thesis was disappointing. As Fischer explains his own 
attitude towards a defence against the argument from evil, Fischer was 
anticipating that a defence would give some reason for thinking theism 
true. Analogously, maybe partisans to the dispute over the rous thesis 
were looking to rous’s defence to help them decide whether or not to 
believe that chicken sarcoma r is caused by a  virus. but people who 
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wanted rous’s defence against the attack on his thesis to give more 
evidence of the truth of that thesis were looking for that evidence in 
the wrong place. The evidence for the rous thesis is not the same as 
a defence against an attack on the thesis. The enterprise of undermining 
an argument against some thesis is not the same as the enterprise of 
showing that thesis true.
In the same way, a successful defence against the argument from evil 
is not itself another argument for the existence of God. No matter how 
successful a defence is, it does not prove the existence of God or show the 
appropriateness of the standard divine attributes or anything else along 
these lines. It is not meant to do any of these things. A defence is the 
warding off of an attack on theism. explanations of the divine attributes 
or arguments for the existence of God have to be found in different places.
because this is what a  defence is, the criteria for the success of 
a defence are a function of what the attack is. When Gertrude Stein was 
being wheeled in for surgery, she turned to her companion Alice and 
demanded, ‘What is the answer?’ When the startled Alice was silent, 
Gertrude said, ‘Well, then, what is the question?’ An analogous approach 
seems right when it comes to the nature of a successful defence. In the 
case of a defence against the argument from evil, the criteria for success 
in the answer depend on the way in which the existence of evil is used to 
question the existence of God.
All the varying forms of the argument from evil aim at the same 
conclusion, namely, ‘God does not exist’. And they also all share this 
feature: that conclusion is supposed to follow from some facts having 
to do with suffering. It is something about suffering in particular – as 
distinct, say, from something about the divine attributes or something 
about the nature of goodness or something about human free will – that 
is supposed to demonstrate that God does not exist. What differentiates 
varying arguments from evil are the different ways in which they use 
suffering to support the conclusion that God does not exist.
before Alvin Plantinga formulated the free-will defence, the most 
influential argument from evil tried to show that God does not exist on 
the basis of the claims that there is evil in the world and that God and 
evil are logically incompatible.7 No possible world that contains suffering 
could also be a  world that contains God. This argument is relatively 
7 For one presentation of Plantinga’s free-will defence, see Alvin Plantinga, God and 
Other Minds (Ithaca, NY: Cornell university Press, 1967), pp. 131-155.
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simple, in the sense that it does not need to consider any specific facts 
about suffering. It does not need to make any claims about the nature 
of particular kinds of suffering, the extent and distribution of suffering, 
the role of suffering in the lives of sufferers, or anything else that would 
require a  lengthy and controversial presentation of evidence. but this 
form of the argument is also much stronger than it needs to be. It does 
not conclude just that God does not exist; it concludes that God could not 
exist in any world containing suffering. The very nature of God and of 
evil makes the co-existence of God and evil impossible.
but, as Plantinga pointed out, the claims
(1) there is an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good God
and
(2) there is suffering
are not by themselves logically inconsistent. At the very least, to argue on 
the basis of the existence of suffering to the conclusion that an omniscient, 
omnipotent, perfectly good God does not exist, a sound argument from 
evil needs to include this premiss:
(3) There is no morally sufficient reason for an omniscient, omnipotent, 
perfectly good God to allow suffering.
This premiss is eminently debatable, however. To defend theism 
against this version of the attack requires only showing that there is 
some possible world in which God has a morally sufficient reason for 
allowing that world’s suffering to exist. Plantinga’s justly celebrated free-
will defence was directed against this form of attack.
Plantinga was generally regarded as successful in that defence.8 At 
the end of the initial debate over Plantinga’s defence, most philosophers 
supposed that Plantinga had succeeded in defending theism against the 
particular attack at issue for him. And because he was widely taken to be 
successful with the free-will defence, the attack shifted and took new form.
8 Fischer suggests that Plantinga’s defence is more open to serious criticism than 
one might suppose from the admiring reception it received. like others before him, 
myself included, Fischer wonders whether Plantinga’s defence is in fact compatible 
with the claim that God is good. In my view, too, it is one thing to allow creatures free 
will, and another thing entirely to stand by passively while they use their free will in 
cruel and hateful depredations of the vulnerable and helpless. Fischer raises this point 
in connection with his own sparse defence, which certainly is open to criticism on this 
score. but whether or not Plantinga’s defence is really open to attack on the grounds that 
it is not consistent with God’s goodness, most people at the time Plantinga published his 
defence took the defence to be successful.
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In its new form, as the evidential argument from evil, the attack 
attempted to reason to the non-existence of God not on the basis of 
a  logical incompatibility between God and suffering but rather on the 
basis of an incompatibility between the existence of God and facts about 
suffering in this world. The idea was that even if there could be a God in 
some world containing suffering, there could not be a God in the actual 
world because of some facts about the suffering in the actual world.
In this version of the attack, the crucial third premiss of the argument 
from evil becomes something like this:
(3’) There is no morally sufficient reason for an omniscient, omnipotent, 
perfectly good God to allow all of the suffering that there is in the 
actual world.
This version of the argument from evil is a lot harder to defend against, 
but then it is also a lot harder to support.
The first thing to notice in this connection is that a very sparse defence 
against this version of the attack is actually easy to construct. Fischer 
proposes for our consideration a  sparse defence involving a  divine 
matrix connecting suffering to the distribution of goods in heaven, but 
in fact a defence even sparser than the one Fischer constructs is readily 
available. All one has to do is to take as a  premiss the denial  of the 
conclusion of the argument from evil and conclude to the denial of one 
of its premises. bill rowe called attention to this possibility and labelled it 
‘the G.e. moore shift’,9 after moore’s famous defence against the sceptical 
attack on knowledge.
The argument of this very sparse defence goes this way:
(The G.e. moore Shift):
(1’) an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good God exists in the 
actual world.
(2’) there is suffering in the actual world.
(not-3’) Therefore, there is a  morally sufficient reason for God to 
allow the suffering in the actual world.
This very sparse defence is helpful for thinking about some of the 
issues both mcNaughton and Fischer raise. As Fischer asks, what is 
wrong with a  sparse defence?10 Why should one think that this very 
9 See William rowe, ‘The Problem of evil and Some Varieties of Atheism’, American 
Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (1979), 335–41.
10 Fischer adds that any sparse defence has to be consistent with the standard divine 
attributes; and he wonders in this connection whether my own defence is not inconsistent 
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sparse defence is not successful? What are the criteria for success in the 
project of defence that rule out a sparse defence such as the G.e. moore 
shift or that make it inadequate in some way?
The answers to these questions are implicit in William rowe’s own 
influential formulation of the evidential argument from evil. As rowe 
constructed the evidential argument from evil in his classic article ‘The 
Problem of evil and Some Varieties of Atheism’, there is a small ancillary 
argument that purports to show premiss (3’) true.
on rowe’s version of the evidential argument, if it is successful, the 
small ancillary argument shows that the sparse defence yields a conclusion 
which is false. That is, if rowe’s ancillary argument is successful, then 
it can be shown that there is no morally sufficient reason for God to 
allow suffering. And if that is so, then since the sparse defence is valid, 
it follows that at least one of the premises in the sparse defence must be 
false. but it has only two. Therefore, since premiss (2’) is conceded to be 
true by all parties to the dispute, the false premiss has to be premiss (1’), 
the premiss claiming that an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good 
God exists in the actual world. And so the sparse defence is shown to 
be unsuccessful. The conclusion of the evidential argument from evil 
stands: God does not exist.
In my view, any other sparse defence will be a  version of the G.e. 
moore shift, and it will succumb in similar ways. The matrix Fischer 
imagines God as using will yield a  kind of morally sufficient reason 
for God to allow suffering, insofar as that matrix is supposed to justify 
God in allowing suffering. And so if rowe’s small ancillary argument 
for premiss (3’) is successful, it will undermine not just the G.e. moore 
shift but any analogous sparse defence, such as Fischer’s sparse defence 
involving God’s matrix.
but notice that the all-important premiss (3’) of the evidential 
argument from evil is a claim about the way things are in the actual world 
– all the suffering in the actual world is such that it is not defeated by 
a morally sufficient reason justifying God in allowing it – and therefore 
so is its denial in a defence.
with God’s goodness since it rests on the claim that God made human beings in such 
a  way that they need healing through suffering. but here Fischer has misunderstood 
me. I claimed explicitly that my defence presupposes that God is not responsible for the 
internally alienated psychic state of human beings; and, in connection with the doctrine 
of original sin, I argued in detail that my account is consistent with the standard divine 
attributes, including omnipotence. See WID, pp. 153-155.
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There are two ways a defence can fail then. obviously, if the defence 
is itself inconsistent, then it fails. Plantinga spent a great deal of effort to 
show that human free will is not incompatible with divine omnipotence, 
in order to show that the free will defence is compatible with the standard 
divine attributes. but a defence will also fail if it can be shown that its 
claims about the way the world is are false. on one basis or another, 
a defence against the evidential argument from evil has to make a claim 
about the way the world is: according to the defence, all the suffering 
in the world is such that it is defeated by a  morally sufficient reason 
justifying God in allowing it. If it can be shown that this claim about 
the way the world is is false, the defence will have been shown to be 
unsuccessful, too. For a  defence to be successful, then, in addition to 
internally consistency in the defence, it has to be the case that its crucial 
empirical claims are not shown to be false.
In WID, in explaining this point, I said that it would take uncontested 
empirical evidence to show the empirical claim of a  defence false. In 
different ways, Fischer and mcNaughton are each concerned about 
my criteria for success in a  defence. In particular, they think that my 
understanding of the requirement for showing false the crucial empirical 
claims of a defence are too demanding. on their view, this requirement 
sets the bar too high for those attempting to rebut a defence.11
but here I think we have to remember the dialectic of the debate. The 
attack on theism by means of the argument from evil wants to show that 
theism is false, that God does not exist; and it claims that it can show 
this on the basis of facts about suffering. but then the attack needs to use 
only premises that are not themselves points of dispute between theism 
and atheism. It would make no difference to theism if it turned out, 
unsurprisingly enough, that a mix of theistic beliefs with beliefs rejected 
by theists formed an inconsistent set. Suppose, for example, that the 
argument from evil included the claim that all suffering causes human 
beings to become more internally fragmented in psyche. This is a claim 
that theists will certainly find incompatible with their beliefs about God. 
So the mix of this empirical claim and theistic belief will in fact constitute 
an inconsistent set, but this fact will not trouble theists, who will simply 
11 Similar objections are raised by Paul Draper in his review of WID in Notre Dame 
Philosophical reviews (July 27, 2011) <http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24772-wandering-
in-darkness-narrative-and-the-problem-of-suffering> [accessed 08/09/2012], and by 
William Hasker, ‘light in the Darkness? reflections on eleonore Stump’s Theodicy’, Faith 
and Philosophy, 28 (2011), 432-50.
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reject the empirical claim about the effects of suffering in human lives. 
So if the argument from evil is to have a chance of being successful, it 
cannot itself rest on controverted empirical claims rejected by theists.
or, to put the same point in a slightly different way, if the argument 
from evil relies on empirical claims rejected by theists, then the 
argument shows not that something about suffering is incompatible 
with the existence of God, but that something about suffering and 
a  controverted empirical claim are incompatible with the existence of 
God. And in that case it is easy to save belief in the existence of God: just 
reject the controverted empirical claim. Since the theist already rejects 
this empirical claim, the lesson that he must reject it to preserve belief in 
the existence of God will not trouble him.
And that is why I claimed that a defence that is internally consistent 
and not in violation of uncontested empirical evidence is successful.
Is there then uncontested empirical evidence to show that the empirical 
claims of the defence in WID are false? This question brings me back to 
Fischer’s sparse defence and rowe’s small ancillary argument that purports 
to refute every version of a  sparse defence. What is rowe’s support for 
the crucial premiss (3’)? unless that support is successful, it seems that 
a sparse defence, such as the G.e. moore shift, should be sufficient to rebut 
the evidential argument from evil, in the form rowe gave it.
rowe’s support for premiss (3’) is actually very simple. It comes 
essentially to this:
Rowe’s ancillary argument for premiss (3’):
Premiss (P)  It appears that there is no morally sufficient reason for 
  God’s allowing the suffering in the actual world.
(3’) Therefore, there is no morally sufficient reason for an omniscient, 
omnipotent, perfectly good God to allow the suffering in the actual world.
A  large literature has arisen around this ancillary argument for 
premiss (3’), and two different ways of undermining it have emerged.
on one of these ways, one can call in question the support (P) gives 
to (3’). It can happen, for different kinds of reason, that appearances 
are a very unreliable guide to reality. For example, if our perceptual or 
cognitive capacities are insufficient to detect the thing in question, then 
with regard to that thing the way things appear to our perception or 
cognition is not a reliable guide to the way things are. Sceptical theism is 
one version of this kind of response to rowe’s argument.
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but a  second way to respond to rowe’s argument is to try to find 
a morally sufficient reason that God could have to allow suffering. If one 
can give a morally sufficient reason that could justify God’s allowing the 
suffering in the actual world, then the appearance that there is no such 
reason is undermined. (And if one can also explain why that morally 
sufficient reason would be difficult to detect, then in addition there is 
good reason for supposing that appearances are not an adequate guide 
to the way things are.)
It was widely thought that the attack on theism posed by rowe’s 
evidential argument from evil was irrefutable by this second way of 
constructing a defence against it. like rowe himself, promoters of this 
version of the argument from evil often took some real or imagined 
heart-breaking example of suffering and then, by way of challenge, asked 
explicitly or implicitly how anyone could be so shameless as to try to give 
a reason that could justify God’s allowing that evil.
And that is the version of the attack on theism by means of an 
argument from evil that I was responding to. The defence I constructed 
was tailored to the sort of attack mounted by rowe and others in the 
formulation of the evidential argument from evil that they gave.
The philosophical or left-brain part (as Paul Draper12 and Fischer 
have called it) of the defence I  constructed, shows the epistemology, 
metaphysics, ethics, psychology, and theology of a world within which 
there is a morally sufficient reason for God to allow suffering of the sort 
found in the actual world. This part of the defence also shows why that 
reason is hard to see. So, without supporting sceptical theism, the left-
brain part of the defence undermines rowe’s argument from evil in both 
the ways in which it is vulnerable.
on the other hand, the narrative or right-brain part of the defence gives 
detailed examples of the particular ways in which that morally sufficient 
reason might operate in the particular life histories of individual people. 
The stories prompt intuitions about the details and the particulars, and 
they also provide insight into why appearances are a bad guide to reality 
in such cases.
12 See Paul Draper’s review of WID in Notre Dame Philosophical reviews, op. cit. 
Draper’s review, which is the toughest review the book has received, is also in my view 
the deepest and most insightful of all the responses to the book. His philosophical acuity 
and his great personal integrity are both in evidence in his review, and I admire him 
greatly on both scores.
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And here it is worth saying a word about the question Fischer raises: 
why bother with defence at all? Why not try to give a theodicy? For that 
matter, one might ask, why not simply say that my defence is a theodicy? 
The usual reason given for preferring a  defence to a  theodicy is that 
a  defence does not claim to give actual reasons for God to allow evil 
and that there is no reason to think finite human beings could know 
the mind of God. Some versions of sceptical theism are expressions of 
this or an analogous attitude. but, in the defence I  constructed, there 
is no reliance on sceptical theism. on the contrary, the defence is not 
shy about attributing to God particular reasons for allowing suffering. 
The defence attributes a particular set of reasons for allowing suffering 
to God and claims God’s revelation as warrant for doing so. So why 
shouldn’t this defence simply be taken as a theodicy?
 The answer lies in the very richness of the defence, to which Fischer 
calls attention. As part of the defence, I adopted a particular set of views in 
metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and moral psychology, together with 
a particular set of positions in psychology, and a particular Thomistic 
theology. All of this is part of the defence. If I were to claim that this is 
a theodicy rather than a defence, I would also have to claim that each 
of these views and positions is true; and then I  would be responsible 
for giving some arguments for each of them. At that point, my book 
would have become a library. but because my project is only a defence, 
I do not have to claim that each of the philosophical, psychological, or 
theological positions I adopt is true. I have to make only the much more 
limited claim that each of them could be true in a world very much like 
ours as regards human beings and suffering.
So one way to think of a  defence such as mine is as a  conditional 
theodicy. If the actual world is the way I  have described the possible 
world of the defence as regards metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, 
psychology, and theology, then my account is a theodicy, which rebuts 
the attack of the evidential argument from evil by giving the morally 
sufficient reasons God actually has for allowing the suffering found in 
the actual world.
And this brings me to the version of the argument from evil in which 
Fischer and mcNaughton express interest. It is yet another attack on 
theism, and it has a  form different from rowe’s evidential argument. 
This version of the attack on theism does not depend crucially on the 
claim that there is no morally sufficient reason for God to allow evil, or 
on support for that claim from the appearances of the world. Instead, 
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this attack relies on a comparison of theism and naturalism with regard 
to plausibility or probability or simplicity or epistemic surprise or 
something else along these lines. This attack is a matter of considering 
naturalism and theism as rival candidates for a grand unifying theory of 
everything, and then judging that naturalism is the better theory of the 
two because it gives a more plausible or more probable or more simple 
or less surprising explanation of the actual world, given that there is 
suffering in the world.13
I myself do not see why anyone would suppose that theism should 
turn to a theodicy or a defence for help with this attack. evaluation of 
comparisons between grand unified theories of everything, and criteria 
for such evaluation, belong to the province of philosophy of science and 
epistemology, not to the realm of either theodicy or defence, as far as 
I can see. but whatever the area of philosophy may be that has global 
theory comparison as part of its domain, evaluation of competing grand 
unified theories (GuTs) of everything is not going to be an easy job.
Pretty clearly, comparing naturalism and theism as rival GuTs will be 
a much harder job than comparing competing theories of the nature of 
light, say, or theories of the disease-causing agent for bovine spongiform 
encephalitis.14 The explananda for naturalism considered as a  GuT 
range from physics to music, from neuroscience to consciousness, from 
sociology to morality, from developmental psychology to awe at beauty 
and self-sacrificial love. It is not an easy matter to say which GuT is 
a better explanation across the board of all these things. or, as Gasser 
13 In his review of WID, Draper makes it clear that he too thinks the argument from 
evil should be understood and formulated in this way. William Hasker’s claims that 
a defence has to be such that, given theism, we have no strong or good reason to think its 
claims false fall into the same family of views. (See Hasker, ‘light in the Darkness?’.) That 
is because, as Gasser’s paper helps to make clear, what one takes to be a good or strong 
reason is a function of all the other things one believes.
14 bovine spongiform encephalitis (bSe), or mad cow disease, which is a  variant 
of a  disease found in human beings and other species, is now believed to be caused 
by a prion, a protein only, that is, a molecule without DNA or rNA. but when Stanley 
Prusiner coined the term ‘prion’ in 1982, most researchers assumed that disease-causing 
agents had to be caused by some living organism and so had to be caused by something 
which included either DNA or rNA. The idea that a simple protein could be a disease-
causing agent greatly complicated the picture of disease then widely shared, and so 
Prusiner’s claim that bSe is caused by a prion was initially met with great scepticism and 
severe criticism. It was widely thought, in the 1980s, that his experiments were defective 
and that he had derived wrong conclusions from them. but Prusiner was right, and in 
1997 he won the Nobel prize for his work on prions.
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might put it, it is not so easy to give an evaluative comparison of highly 
differing worldviews.
In his own formulation of this version of the attack on theism, Paul 
Draper bases his argument from evil on the claim that, in the face of 
suffering in the world, naturalism is a simpler theory of the world than 
theism.15 but consider the problems facing Draper in trying to make 
a comparison of this sort.
To begin with, what makes a  theory simple? Is a  theory simple in 
virtue of having only a small number of laws? In virtue of postulating 
only a  small number of entities? In virtue of postulating only entities 
and laws that are themselves simple? And what makes an entity or 
a law simple? In addition, even if we could find a good set of criteria for 
simplicity in theories, what makes one theory simpler than another? If 
one theory postulates more laws but fewer entities than another theory 
that postulates fewer laws but more entities, which is the simpler theory? 
If one theory postulates many laws and many entities but leaves nothing 
unexplained, is it a simpler theory than one which has fewer laws and 
fewer entities but also has a number of unexplained brute facts?
even if we agreed on all these issues, how are we to weigh simplicity 
against other virtues of a  theory? A  theory could be simple but dead 
wrong, because the phenomena it is attempting to describe are 
themselves complicated. earlier competing theories of the nature 
of light were very simple by comparison with quantum mechanics, 
for example.16 According to contemporary descriptions of quantum 
mechanics, quantum mechanics tells us that light is both a  wave and 
a particle, that a particle can be both decayed and not decayed, that a cat 
can be both alive and dead, and that particles at opposite ends of the 
universe can be entangled, so that they operate in tandem even when 
there is no possibility of a signal passing between them. Surely, this is 
a  very complicated theory of light, much less simple than its earlier 
competitors. but, according to contemporary physics, the complicated 
theory is right, and the earlier, simpler theories are false.
Very roughly analogous things can be said as regards probability, 
plausibility, and epistemic surprise. What makes one theory more 
15 I am grateful to Draper for sharing with me in advance material from his forthcoming 
book on this subject, which will be impressive, judging from what I have seen of it. See 
also his review of WID.
16 I  am focusing here just on the example involving light, but see footnote 14 for 
a similar example involving disease-causing agents.
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plausible or less surprising than another will depend on very many 
things, difficult to evaluate. And, in addition, there will be great subjective 
variability. What one person finds plausible or surprising depends on 
the other things that person believes. Few biologically literate people 
now find it surprising or implausible to suppose that a virus can cause 
a cancer that runs in families. We understand now that a virus can hijack 
the genome of an organism, and that some genomes are more vulnerable 
than others to the onslaught of particular viruses. but a hundred years 
ago, when we knew very little about the nature of genes or the operation 
of viruses, the idea that a  virus could cause a  sarcoma which runs in 
families seemed wildly implausible, outrageously surprising, to most 
biologists. It seemed so improbable a notion that no one bothered even 
to try to replicate the experiments rous reported in 1911. It was not until 
1966 that rous won the Nobel prize for his discoveries – which seemed 
so implausible and surprising in 1911.
So, for all these reasons, I do not think it will be an easy matter to 
show that, with naturalism and theism taken as grand unified theories 
of everything, naturalism is to be preferred to theism. or, to put it in 
Gasser’s terms, I do not think it will be easy to weigh worldviews and 
give a good argument that the naturalistic one is in every way preferable 
to the theistic one.
So this latest version of the attack on theism, with its formulation of 
the argument from evil depending on global theory comparison, does 
not look particularly promising to me. but whatever its merits may be, 
it is not the form of the attack my defence is meant to defend against. 
I am grateful to Gasser, Fischer, and mcNaughton for their thoughtful 
comments and questions which helped me to clarify further than I had 
originally done what the project of my defence is.
IV. THe HArDeST CASeS
Finally, mcNaughton and I agree about which cases are the hardest for 
the defence in WID, and I want to finish by saying one more word about 
them. These cases were a special focus for me in WID. There I said that,
by his choices and actions, it is possible for one creature to destroy 
entirely any office of love he had or might have had with another. The 
entire system of creation, as Aquinas sees it, is predicated on this sort 
of possibility, even for God. There cannot be a union of love between 
two persons, even if one of them is divine, unless there are two persons. 
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Something whose will is completely determined by another cannot be 
united with that other; there is only one will in such a case, not the two 
needed for union. For God, ... to be willing to take another person, with 
an independent will, as the desire of the heart is to accept the possibility 
of being rejected instead of being loved.17
on these views, if Paula has her daughter Julia as the desire of her heart, 
then it is entirely possible for Paula to lose her heart’s desire irrevocably. 
How, then, could it be possible for God nonetheless to provide for Paula 
her heart’s desire, even in a refolded form, as the defence in WID requires? 
As mcNaughton sees it, there is no good answer to this question.
The problem with mcNaughton’s position is its tacit presupposition 
that a person who rejects love is the same as she would be if she accepted 
love. but this presupposition is mistaken, in my view, and it makes 
a great difference to the assessment of the satisfaction of a heart’s desire 
for that person.
on the kind of example mcNaughton has in mind, Julia is the heart’s 
desire of her mother Paula, but Julia rejects Paula’s love as well as God’s 
and goes to the bad (as mcNaughton puts it). For the sake of adding 
concreteness to the example and thereby aiding intuition, suppose that 
Julia’s going to the bad includes Julia’s being addicted to drugs and 
supporting her habit by theft and drug-dealing. In the beginning of 
Julia’s choices to continue her drug habit by dealing and stealing, Paula 
will do all she can for Julia; and she will hope against hope that Julia 
can be redeemed and restored to her mother’s love. but after years of 
struggle, during which Paula suffers one pain, one defeat, after another 
because of Julia’s continual betrayal of her mother’s love, Paula will come 
to understand that Julia is what her choices have made her: a  selfish 
thief, a callous drug-dealer, an irredeemable drug addict. At that point, 
Paula will no longer want Julia to live with her. At that point, no one 
will want Julia to live with her, because no one will want the kinds of 
depredations Julia invariably brings with her.
even in these circumstances, at this point, it is still possible for Paula 
(or for anyone else) to love Julia; but, because of what Julia has become, 
the office of love will change from what it might have been. For example, 
Paula’s desire to have Julia as part of her daily life (which is the form 
a desire for union with Julia would have had in Paula) will change in 
Paula to become only compassion for Julia held at a distance. And the 
17 WID, p. 474.
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desire for Julia’s good will change into a desire to give whatever care Julia 
will still accept.
but these changes in Paula’s desires of love for Julia will not leave Paula 
in a state of heart-brokenness if Paula has woven her desire for Julia into 
a deepest heart’s desire for God, as I argued in WID. Interwoven in that 
way, Paula’s love for Julia will be situated within Paula’s participation in 
union with God, shared with other persons who are also united to God 
in love. The loneliness Julia has willed for herself cannot take away the 
joy of that shared union for Paula. on the contrary, Julia’s choices have 
changed her from the dear companion she might have been for Paula to 
a hard-edged destructive creature, cold-hearted to others, focused only 
on feeding her habit.
Seen in this way, Julia is not someone who rejects Paula; she is someone 
who excludes herself from the joy in which Paula’s life is lived. And so what 
might have been an active desire on Paula’s part to have Julia as an intimate 
part of her life will become an encompassing compassion, content to offer 
as much care as possible to a person who has walled herself off from love. 
In this shape, Paula’s heart’s desire for Julia can be satisfied.
even in these hardest cases, then, a heart’s desire can refold and be 
satisfied in that refolded form. If Julia rejects the love of Paula and of God, 
it is still open to Paula to love Julia as she can from within the joy of union 
with God. In that condition, even her grief over Julia’s rejection of love 
can be encompassed in the fulfilment of Paula’s deepest heart’s desire 
to love God and be loved by him. In the face of Julia’s rejection, Paula’s 
heart’s desire for Julia, like God’s own desire for those of his creatures 
who reject him, has to refold from a desire for realized union to a desire 
for giving compassion and care. but, refolded in this way, it is also capable 
of fulfilment from within the joy of the shared union of love with God.
So I  share mcNaughton’s sensitive judgment that such cases are 
the hardest ones for theodicy and defence. but, in my view, the (real 
or imagined) details of such cases point to a resolution of those cases, 
too. As I argued in WID, ultimately, one person’s darkness cannot take 
away another person’s joy. but that is what would happen if Julia’s willed 
loneliness left Paula permanently heartbroken.
No one has put this point better than C.S. lewis, in my view. In 
addressing this same issue (though under a different guise), C.S. lewis 
has one of the redeemed in heaven say to her husband, who will not 
accept her love or God’s,
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Frank, ... listen to reason. Did you think joy was created to live always 
... defenceless against those who would rather be miserable than have 
their self-will crossed? ... You made yourself really wretched. That you 
can still do. but you can no longer communicate your wretchedness. ... 
our light can swallow up your darkness: but your darkness cannot now 
infect our light.18
lewis has his own character in the story comment doubtingly on this 
speech, ‘Is it really tolerable that she should be untouched by his misery, 
even his self-made misery?’ In response, his teacher in the story says,
That sounds very merciful but see what lurks behind it. ... The demand 
of the loveless and the self-imprisoned that they should be allowed 
to blackmail the universe: till they consent to be happy (on their own 
terms) no one else shall taste joy: that theirs should be the final power ... 
I know it has a grand sound to say ye’ll accept no salvation which leaves 
even one creature in the dark outside. but watch that sophistry or ye’ll 
make a Dog in a manger the tyrant of the universe.19
CoNCluSIoN
With that final response, let me conclude by saying one more time how 
much I  appreciate all the stimulating comments of all these papers. 
I  am grateful for the thoughtfulness and insights which their authors 
have brought to bear on Wandering in Darkness and on the important 
questions about suffering that are of great concern to all of us.20
18 C. S. lewis, The Great Divorce (San Francisco, CA: Harper, 2001), pp. 132-133.
19 C. S. lewis, The Great Divorce, pp. 135-146.
20 In addition to the authors to whose papers I am responding here, others also need 
to be thanked. I  am particularly grateful to conversations with Paul Draper and the 
participants in the 2011 St. Thomas Summer Seminar in Philosophy of religion and 
Philosophical Theology, organized by michael rota and Dean Zimmerman, under 
the aegis of a  grant from the John Templeton Foundation. I  am also grateful for the 
comments and questions from participants in the APA Pacific Division session held on 
WID and from participants in the workshop on WID held at the university of Innsbruck 
and organized by Georg Gasser.
